The role of government in facilitating the innovative capacity of industry:

The case of the Tasmanian light shipbuilding industry. by Wickham, M
The Role of Government in Facilitating the Innovative Capacity of Industry: 
The Case of the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry. 
 
 
Dr Mark Wickham  
University of Tasmania 
 
 
Abstract. 
 
In order to understand the positive role that regional governments can play in 
facilitating the innovative capacity of its industries, this paper analyses the 25-
year history of the Tasmanian government’s interaction with the Tasmanian Light 
Shipbuilding Industry.  The research findings indicate that unlike governments of 
major economies, regional governments play a central and necessarily intrusive 
role in the facilitation of an industry’s innovative capacity, and that this role is 
necessarily changeable over its life cycle.  This paper provides a discussion of the 
policy implications, and presents a reconceptualisation of Porter’s Diamond 
Factor Model for policy makers in regional economic settings. 
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The Role of Government in Facilitating the Innovative Capacity of Industry: 
The Case of the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry. 
 
Introduction. 
 
Since the 1970s, the onrush of globalisation in Australia’s markets has presented 
significant economic policy challenges to the country’s federal and state-based 
governments (Everett, 2002; Goldfinch, 1999).  A major concern for Australian 
legislators was (and remains) the question as to how to make a nation previously 
protected by a ‘fortress’ of tariffs and subsidies more innovative and competitive 
in world markets (Brown, 2000; Edwards, 2002).  One theoretical framework that 
achieved prominence in Australian innovation policy development is Porter’s 
Industrial Cluster Theory (ICT) (see Australian Manufacturing Council, 1994; 
Keating, 1994).   As part of his book The Competitive Advantage of Nations, 
Porter developed the notion that the innovative capacity of industry was integral 
to export earnings and the generation of national competitive advantage.  Porter’s 
ICT argues that a nation’s industry will be both innovative and internationally 
competitive if a synergistic interrelationship exists between six important 
variables collectively known as the Diamond Factor Model (DFM): (See Porter 
(1990) for a discussion of the DFM, and Figure 1 for a diagrammatic 
representation). 
 
Figure 1: Porter’s (1990) Diamond Factor Model. 
 
 
Since the adoption of Porter’s DFM as a basis for innovation-policy development, 
however, there has been considerable debate concerning its effectiveness as a 
framework for facilitating the innovative capacity of industry in the economic 
regions of Australia (see Boddy, 2000; Gordon & McCann, 2000).  The debate 
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has arisen due to an observed disconnect between the country’s numerous (and 
expensive) attempts to incorporate the DFM as a policy framework, and the fact 
that Australia remains significantly below the OECD average in terms of its 
industries’ innovative capacity and economic contributions to real wealth creation 
(OECD, 1998).  
 
An examination of the literature identifies three main issues that account for the 
observed failures and under-performance of Australian industrial innovation 
policy.   The first major issue is that Australian government policy development 
has largely been focused on descriptive information gathering rather than on 
achieving either business participation in, or greater understanding of the complex 
innovation process (Davies, 2001).  The second major issue surrounds an 
assumption by Australian policy-makers that the facts explaining industry 
innovation around the globe are readily generalisable to the regional Australian 
context (Boddy, 2000).  The third issue concerns the record of Australian 
governments’ resource allocation as it pertains the development of industry 
innovation.  Feser and Bergman (2000) note that, at least at the regional level, the 
approach frequently adopted by policymakers involves little more than the 
identification of current regional specialisations as targets for traditional 
development initiatives.  In such cases, innovation policy development strategies 
served more often as a means of allocating scarce resources than as a way to build 
the linkages and future inter-industry synergies documented so frequently in 
highly innovative industrial districts (Feser & Bergman, 2000).   
 
In order to understand the positive roles that a regional government can play in the 
facilitation of an industry’s innovative capacity, this paper reports upon an 
examination of the 25-year history of the Tasmanian Light Shipbuilding Industry 
(TLSI). The origin of the TLSI can be traced back to 1984, and the development 
of the world’s first aluminium welding technology by the innovative firm 
‘International Catamarans’ (hereafter ‘Incat’)(Industry Audit, 1998).  Some years 
before, Incat’s managing director Robert Clifford, had identified an opportunity to 
construct high quality fast ferries for the world market, but required the assistance 
of a number of his ‘maritime network friends’ to help develop the lightweight 
technology needed to construct such a vessel.  The integration of a number of 
different product lines from the other industry members (i.e. light-weight life raft 
equipment, light-weight fire safety equipment, lightweight fit-outs, innovative 
engineering products etc.) became central to the industry’s international success. 
Over time, the industry was able to forge a dominant position in the global market 
for fast ferries (and the associated technology), and by 1998 accounted for 40 
percent world market for passenger ferries (Wickham, 2005).  The innovative 
capacity of the TLSI is also demonstrated by the fact that by 2000, firms that had 
once solely existed to supply Incat’s specific needs managed to forge significant 
export sales and R&D alliances with shipbuilding firms from around the globe. 
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Method. 
 
This research comprised a series of semi-structured interviews with key 
informants within the TLSI and the Tasmanian government.  In particular, 
interviews were conducted with each of Tasmania’s Premiers during the TLSI’s 
formation (1977- 2002), the managing directors of the TLSI firms, and the heads 
of government departments and agencies with which the TLSI had significant 
interactions. In total 25 semi-structured interviews were conducted, each lasting 
between 60 and 90 minutes.  Both the standardised and specific interview 
questions were formulated to facilitate the aggregation, analysis, and validation of 
information, and enabled the researcher to interrogate the evidence gathered from 
other sources.  These questions were designed to cover the necessary issues, but 
were framed in an open-ended manner, to allow the interviewees sufficient 
latitude for introspection and open reporting of their own perspectives.  As a 
result, the informants were free to pursue those matters that they considered 
important.  The interpretation of the data, and the verification of the conclusions, 
were facilitated by the use of the QSR NUD*IST software package.  In the 
method literature, it has been emphasised that computer software programs such 
as NUD*IST, are of significant value in qualitative analysis and any subsequent 
theory building (Weitzman & Miles, 1995).   
 
One of the most prevalent concerns surrounding the reporting of longitudinal 
industrial innovation research concerns the evolutionary nature of the industrial 
life cycle.  Peters and Hood (2000) discuss how the industrial life cycle notion can 
influence the effectiveness of a government’s policy platform.  A growing 
literature base suggests that ‘who innovates’ and ‘how much’ innovative activity 
is undertaken by an industry is closely linked to the phase of the industry life 
cycle, and is of vital importance to effective policy implementation (Leigh, 2003).  
It is therefore necessary to report on the longitudinal variation in government 
policy development, and link it to the innovative capacity of the TLSI over its life 
cycle. 
 
Results. 
 
The government’s role during introductory stage of the TLSI’s life cycle. 
 
During the introductory stage of its life cycle, three key government roles 
positively influenced the innovative capacity of the TLSI.  The first was the 
Tasmanian government’s initial non-committal stance towards the specific 
development of the region’s burgeoning shipbuilding industry (see Wickham, 
2005 for details).   The second role surrounded the enhancement of Tasmania’s 
reputation within the domestic market as a centre for maritime research.  The third 
role was the government’s support for the entrepreneurial activities undertaken by 
the industry’s most innovative firm at the time, International Catamarans 
(hereafter ‘Incat’), when it became apparent that it was a potential source of 
significant economic growth for the region.  
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The Tasmanian government’s initial non-committal stance towards the region’s 
burgeoning industry was not a deliberate one, as its policy focus at the time was 
on the macro-economic restructuring of the region’s economy (away from its 
dependence on hydro-industrialisation which had dominated the region’s 
economic development since the 1960s).   Due to this focus on the macro-
economic restructuring process, the Tasmanian government did not at any stage 
pre-empt the growth requirements of the region’s ‘new’ innovative shipbuilding 
industry.  As such, the government inadvertently avoided the issues surrounding 
many of Australia’s innovation-policy failures of the 1990s in which governments 
built up infrastructural support in the hope of attracting innovative firms, as for 
example, the South Australian government did with the failed multi-function polis 
planned for Adelaide.  Consequently, the development of the innovative 
technologies (i.e. the development of elements of Porter’s ‘Firm Strategy, 
Structure and Rivalry’) remained the sole responsibility of the private sector firms 
that existed during the industry’s initial foray into aluminium-welding technology 
(i.e. Incat and the maritime network in which it had operated).    
 
The second key role was the Tasmanian government’s development of the 
region’s reputation within the broader domestic maritime market as a national 
centre for maritime research.  The government implemented a series of lobbying 
initiatives that resulted in the federal government providing additional funding to 
the Australian Maritime College and relocating its national maritime research 
institute (the CSIRO) to Hobart.  The lobbying efforts were largely aimed at the 
federal government rather than the private sector, but their success had 
implications for the region’s ‘Factor Conditions’, ‘Related and Supporting 
Industry’, and ‘Demand Conditions’. The region’s ‘Factor Conditions’ were 
advanced by developing the region’s supply of human capital through both the 
generation of specialised employment and education within the broader industry.  
The region’s ‘Related and Supporting Industry’ was advanced by the increase in 
the sophistication of supply of inputs to the private sector firms (in terms of 
products and world standard maritime research).  The Tasmanian government’s 
enhancement of the region’s reputation helped to develop the demand conditions 
faced by the private sector shipbuilding firms, most significantly in the from of 
revenues from interstate customers.   It was only after the domestic exporting 
success of Incat’s innovative semi-aluminium catamarans in the early 1980s were 
realised that the Tasmanian government undertook its third key role, that of 
accommodating the growth requirements of the firm driving the aluminium-
welding innovation within the TLSI.   
 
Although the Tasmanian government did provide its first direct support for Incat’s 
innovative management in the introductory stage of the TLSI’s life cycle, it did so 
only after the firm was able to demonstrate the potential in the domestic 
Australian market for fast-ferry transportation.  The Tasmanian government’s 
support for Incat’s innovation was provided only when the firm could demonstrate 
that it did not possess the resources required for its continued expansion.  The 
government also required evidence that their support of Incat’s expansion would 
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result in additional jobs being created within the industry.   This initial 
government support is consistent with the recommendation of Porter’s DFM, as it 
allows for the challenges facing the burgeoning industry to be overcome whilst 
avoiding the inefficiencies associated with the government’s direct involvement in 
private sector enterprise. 
 
The government’s role during the growth stage of the TLSI’s life cycle. 
 
During the growth stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the innovative capacity of the TLSI.  The first was the Tasmanian 
government’s continued effort to enhance the reputation of the regional 
economy’s maritime capabilities, although the focus of these efforts changed from 
a focus on the domestic maritime market to one that encompassed the 
international market for Incat’s aluminium fast-ferries.  The second was the 
government’s direct involvement in Incat’s sales and negotiation processes with 
their international customers.  The third was the government’s policy initiatives 
that served to maximise the synergistic relationship that existed between Incat and 
its similarly innovative ‘supplier firms’. 
 
The first of the Tasmanian government policies that positively influenced the 
innovative capacity of the TLSI was the continued enhancement of the region’s 
reputation as a centre for maritime excellence, although the policy’s focus 
changed markedly to encompass the international marketplace.  This change in 
focus was driven by the continued success of Incat’s innovative product line in 
the domestic ferry transportation market.  Through the use of government 
sponsored trade missions and the associated negotiation activities, the Tasmanian 
government used the success of Incat to illustrate the region’s maritime 
competency to international customers, in turn facilitating an increase in the 
international demand conditions for Incat’s production.  The Tasmanian 
government also applied political pressure on the remainder of the TLSI firms to 
similarly increase the quality and innovation of their production in line with the 
growing international reputation of the region.  The government helped the 
region’s shipbuilding and maritime manufacturing firms to achieve high quality 
production by maintaining its existing lobbying efforts for additional federal 
infrastructural funding for the industry.  
 
Specifically, the Tasmanian government undertook political action to secure 
additional funding for the TLSI’s educational and R&D requirements.  As with its 
direct support for Incat’s needs, however, the Tasmanian government only lobbied 
for additional federal government funding when the firm could demonstrate their 
provision was necessary for its continued expansion.  The Tasmanian 
government’s reputation enhancement strategy served to increase the ‘Demand 
Conditions’ enjoyed by the region’s shipbuilding industry, and in particular, for 
the output of the regional industry’s most innovative firm, Incat.  It also served to 
apply a degree of political pressure upon the Incat’s suppliers to similarly improve 
their innovative output in line with the growing prestige of the region. 
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The second role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was that of direct 
support during Incat’s sales negotiations with their potential international 
customers.  This was directed by the incumbent state Premier, through his 
department of economic development, most notably in the form of funding for 
international customer visits to Incat’s factory, but also by having the Premier 
accompany the potential customer during their visit.  As a result of the regional 
government’s policy initiative to become involved in Incat’s sales negotiation 
process, it provided a level of prestige, moral support and sales expertise that was 
otherwise beyond the ability of Incat to provide.  Indirectly, this policy also 
served to highlight the supplier firms within the TLSI, as their inputs into Incat’s 
final product were also supported by the regional government’s involvement in 
the sale.   In terms of advancing the Diamond Factors, the Tasmanian 
government’s second policy initiative served to develop the regional industry’s 
‘Firm Strategy, Structure and Rivalry’ by state Premier’s personal endorsement of 
the TLSI’s output.  It also served to align the TLSI firms’ goals with that of the 
regional government by pressuring all of the individual firms to innovate their 
products in line with the requirements of Incat.  In terms of advancing the 
‘Demand Conditions’ enjoyed by the regional industry, the Tasmanian 
government’s involvement served to enhance the legitimacy of Incat’s product to 
potential international customers.  
 
The third key role undertaken by the Tasmanian government was to undertake 
measures to deliberately maximise the synergistic relationship that existed 
between Incat and its supplier firms.  Inherent in Porter’s DFM is the notion that 
within a network of firms, some forms of scale or scope economies exist through 
which the industry develops an internationally competitive advantage.  Through 
its development of marine parks and industrial councils (in which firms 
complementary to Incat’s operations can more easily interact) the Tasmanian 
government deliberately enabled the realisation of the synergies of both scale and 
scope inherent to the region’s ‘natural industry’ (again, see Wickham, 2005).   
The third role served to advance the Diamond Factors by developing the ‘Firm 
Strategy, Structure and Rivalry’ and the ‘Factor Conditions’ enjoyed by the TLSI 
firms in residence at a dedicated marine park in Tasmania’s capital city of Hobart.  
With the TLSI firms in close geographic proximity, the individual firms were 
better able to communicate and coordinate their interrelated production and 
training activities, as well as allowing them to access the advanced and specialised 
(and expensive) infrastructure developed for the marine park.   
 
The government’s role during the maturity stage of the TLSI’s life cycle. 
 
During the maturity stage of its life cycle, three key government roles positively 
influenced the innovative capacity of the TLSI.  The first key role was the 
continued enhancement of the regional economy’s reputation as a world-class 
centre for maritime manufacturing, although the focus changed from the singular 
promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the production of the entire set of 
industry members, be they directly involved in Incat’s aluminium innovation 
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processes or otherwise.  The second role was to formalise the relationships that 
existed within the regional shipbuilding and marine manufacturing industries.  
The third role was the government’s deliberate strategy to dilute Incat’s 
importance and impact upon the TLSI. 
 
The first key government role was its continued enhancement of the regional 
economy’s reputation as a world centre for maritime manufacturing excellence. 
During the maturity stage however, the focus of the Tasmanian government’s 
reputation strategy in the world fast-ferry market changed from the singular 
promotion of Incat’s success to incorporate the output of the entire industry.  The 
functional strategies incorporated by the Tasmanian government included trade 
missions, direct involvement in the international sales negotiations process, and 
the provision of marketing assistance to the industry.  The marketing assistance 
provided to the industry was specifically targeted at generating a consistent 
message for all of Tasmanian firms in the international marketplace.  The policy 
to incorporate the entire set of TLSI firms developed the demand conditions for 
the regional industry, with the region now marketed as a ‘one-stop-shop’ for a 
wide variety of innovative and high-quality maritime production, not simply fast 
catamaran production.  The Tasmanian government could afford to undertake this 
marketing strategy given the success that the TLSI firms had enjoyed both 
individually, and as a network, during the growth phase.  For example, by the end 
of the growth stage of the TLSI’s development, each of the supplier firms had 
secured their own export sales independent of those associated with their alliance 
with Incat.  Further to this, two additional TLSI firms, Liferaft Systems and 
Richardson Devine, emerged within the industry and enjoyed immediate export 
success, largely due to their association with Incat and the innovative and valuable 
nature of their output.   
 
The second key role was to formalise the relationship between the region’s entire 
set of shipbuilders and maritime manufacturers (firms directly involved in the 
development of the aluminium technology or otherwise) and the Tasmanian 
government.  After the Prince of Wales Bay maritime park was established, the 
private sector firms, along with the government-run Aluminium Welding School, 
formed the Tasmanian Maritime Network (TMN) within which the TLSI could 
better develop its communications and lobbying efforts.  After the Tasmanian 
government’s industry audit program of 1998 was completed, the TMN was 
restructured to form an industry council that represented 85 percent of the region’s 
shipbuilding and marine manufacturing firms.  The industry council program 
sought to provide the region’s shipbuilding industry with a direct communication 
and lobbying channel between the industry and the Tasmanian government.  The 
industry council arrangement also helped to ensure that that the set of firms within 
the industry could better incorporate the success factors of the most innovative 
firms into their operations, and therefore become involved in the process of 
further developing the regional industry’s ‘Firm Strategy Structure and Rivalry’ to 
comply with world-best standards.   
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The third key role was the Tasmanian government’s strategy to dilute Incat’s 
importance and impact on the TLSI.  The policy was implemented through the 
attraction of additional innovative shipbuilding firms to the region (producing 
innovative vessels unlike those offered by Incat) in the hope that the TLSI’s 
supplier firms would have alternate and incremental sources of sales and 
innovation opportunities.  The government was able to attract additional 
innovative firms through marketing the region’s advanced infrastructure, support 
that was initially provided for the benefit of Incat.  Where needed, the 
government also provided the option to undertake an equity arrangement with the 
newly invited firms, an arrangement that involved funding of the new firms’ 
relocation and start-up costs, but did not involve the regional government 
intervening in the innovative process of the firm.  This policy initiative had a 
direct impact on the innovative capacity of TLSI by effectively driving 
incremental demand from the international marketplace for region’s maritime 
production.  In addition, it allowed the Incat’s supplier firms to develop 
exponentially greater linkages within the industry, and more importantly, with 
firms of similar importance as Incat in terms of their innovative ability and supply 
requirements.   
 
Discussion 
 
The implications for the role of a regional government in the facilitation of an 
industry’s innovative capacity are four-fold.  The first implication surrounds the 
government’s initial response to the potential formation of an innovative ‘new’ 
industry.  In the TLSI case, the research indicates that the regional government’s 
initial support for any emergent entrepreneurial activity must be commensurate 
with its relevance to the region’s ‘natural advantages’ and the likelihood of their 
commercial success in export markets.  The reverse holds that regional 
governments need to be aware that supporting entrepreneurial activity that does 
not closely align with the region’s natural advantages and store of social capital 
may be likely to relocate their activity as more cost effective opportunities arise.    
 
The second implication surrounds the importance of the regional government’s 
role within Porter’s DFM.  The research indicates that the government of a 
regional Australian economy needs to position itself as a central variable within 
Porter’s DFM.  That is, the government of a regional Australian economy cannot 
positively and effectively influence innovative capacity as an exogenous variable 
as assumed in the Porter’s original DFM.  Instead, the government of a regional 
Australian economy has a significant role to play in its development (given its 
relative size to the region’s gross domestic product), and the DFM requires some 
alteration to reflect this central role (see Figure 2). Despite the intrusive role 
required by the government in the regional economy, it is important to note that at 
no stage did the regional government seek to influence the innovative nature of 
the industry, which was always left in the hands of the private sector and its 
entrepreneurs.   
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Similarly, the incorporation of ‘Chance Events’ into a government’s innovation 
policy framework is also reasonable.  In Porter’s original DFM, chance events, 
alongside the role of government, are viewed as exogenous variables that may 
impact on an industry’s innovative capacity from time to time.  Given the findings 
of this research, chance events that align closely with the human and social capital 
generated within an economy may be viewed as ‘economically relevant’, and 
therefore, play a boundary setting role within which innovative industries may be 
effectively developed by the government’s interaction with the other Diamond 
Factors.   
 
The third implication is that the role of the government in a regional economy is 
necessarily variable over the life cycle of an industry, and as a result it needs to 
have the capability to identify and monitor the set of innovative industries that 
exist within the region, and their stage of development.  It is also important for the 
government to avoid the adoption of a ‘one size fits all’ policy regime for its set of 
industries, as each will have its own requirements given their own particular stage 
of development.  Central to this point is the need for government to be able to 
recognise the existing and potential synergies that exist within an industry, and 
therefore be better able to aid the optimisation of any idiosyncratic relationships.   
 
The fourth implication of this research is that government must provide the 
required infrastructural needs of the developing industry, however, the manner of 
its provision is clearly demonstrated by the Tasmanian government in this case.  
Firstly, the needs of the industry were never pre-empted by the government.  
Instead, the government awaited a claim from the private sector firms, with 
demonstrable evidence that without its provision, innovation and productivity 
within the industry would decline.  Given the above discussion, Figure 2 presents 
a plausible alternative DFM for the facilitation of industry innovation in regional 
Australian economies. In line with the research findings, the ‘Role of 
Government’ is altered from an exogenous variable to one that is central, and 
necessarily intrusive.  As discussed, the key to an effective government role 
centres on the timing of its policy initiatives and the changing needs of the 
industry over its life cycle. Similarly, ‘Chance Events’ are incorporated into the 
adapted model, and although they are represented here as an important variable, 
their occurrence is not considered essential to the development of innovative 
industries.  Instead, ‘Chance Events’ are characterised as occurrences that serve to 
initiate innovative industrial activities.  The region’s store of ‘Social Capital’ is 
also incorporated into the adapted model.  Although it may lie dormant for some 
considerable length of time, the variable represents the set of intangible economic 
assets possessed by a region’s labour market, and serve as a basis for any 
significant increases in the innovative capacity of an industry within an economic 
region. 
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Figure 2: An Adaptation of Porter’s DFM for the Facilitation of Industry 
Innovation in a Regional Economy. 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper presented a longitudinal case study that included interview data from 
an array of policy makers and private sector managers directly involved in the 
TLSI over a 25-year period. Although admittedly a single case with all the 
problems of generalisability that are implied, the wealth of data gathered lends its 
argument some authority and carries advisory messages for regional governments 
worldwide.  This research adds a fine-grained view to Porter’s (in Trinca, 2002) 
comments that emphasised the need for both researchers and practitioners to 
better understand the government’s role in developing the innovative capacity of 
industry. The success of the regional Tasmanian government in developing the 
innovative capacity of the TLSI suggests that governments should ideally 
encourage any innovative activities that closely align with a region’s social and 
economic strengths. The need to vary the type and strength of government policy 
assistance over time was also emphasised, for example by providing training only 
after needs had become apparent and infrastructure and training could be 
specifically targeted. Overall, the TLSI case study provides an object lesson for 
government policy development that positively facilitated the innovative capacity 
of a burgeoning industry, whilst simultaneously avoiding the perils associated 
with the creation of de facto protectionist policy regimes. 
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